A Far From Simple Matter:

Syntactic Reflexes of Syntax-Pragmatics Misalignments

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1. Introductory remarks

It is a well-known fact that the relationship between syntactic structure and its semantico-pragmatic impact is often less than trivial or straightforward. One of the many cases that show this is found in examples like the following:

(1) Would you be kind enough to open the window?

The point here is that this is syntactically speaking a yes/no question but is pragmatically most naturally interpreted as a request. Hence, (2a) is slightly surprising as an answer, while (2b) is the expected answer.

(2) a. Yes, I would.
    b. OK, I will. / No, I won't.

In the pragmatics literature, such cases are referred to as 'speech act idioms' or as 'short-circuited conversational implicatures' (cf. Horn (1988) for a concise discussion). Put in yet another, perhaps more syntactic way, one might say that the subordinate clause in (1) is semantico-pragmatically superordinate in that the subordinate clause conveys the content of the request while the superordinate clause translates into 'please'.

There are other constructions in which what appears to be superordinate and subordinate from the syntactic point of view seem to be reversed when interpreted from the perspective of semantics and/or pragmatics. Certain so-called hedges are notorious in this regard. Take an example like (3).

(3) This argument is close to convincing

At first sight, close is the predicative adjective while to convincing is a PP dependent on close. The actual meaning, however, is that close to is a hedge modifying the adjective convincing. Yielding a meaning roughly like 'almost fully convincing'. Hedges constitute a rather notorious semantic problem because they cause difficulties for straightforward accounts in terms of truth conditions. Strictly speaking, anything that is not fully convincing is not convincing. But on the other hand, conventions of understatement might cause you to utter (3) when you can find no fault with the argument. Hedges, in fact, are most often used in cases where the speaker does not want to assume full responsibility for a statement. A variety of terms have emerged in discussions of such matters. In a recent article, Lasersohn (1999) speaks about 'semantic slack' and 'pragmatic slack', and devises a theory of 'pragmatic halos' to deal with phenomena of this general type.

I will gladly leave the pragmatic intricacies to the experts, but in the present article I propose to discuss a few cases in which such apparent misalignments of what is subordinate and what is superordinate may well have a structural effect on the syntactic representations that are involved. More specifically, I will discuss three cases in which the superordinate-subordinate conflict reduces to the question of which one of two candidates is the head of the construction.
2. **A couple of harder than usual problems**

2.1. **Direct partitive constructions**

In an early article on this type of misalignment phenomena, Kajita (1977) points out that in complex nominal expressions of the type **Det N<sub>1</sub> of Det N<sub>2</sub>** it is sometimes the second N which is felt to be the semantic head, even though on a standard analysis, the first N is the matrix head, while the second N is embedded within a complement or adjunct to the first noun. Kajita cites examples like the following:

(4) 
- a. A couple of weeks passed
- b. The report does not contain a fraction of truth
- c. We did not find a vestige of evidence

He points out, among other things, that in certain varieties of English the preposition *of* can be omitted:

(5) A couple weeks passed

As a matter of fact, omitting the preposition is the normal way to express Direct Partitives (cf. Vos 1999) or Pseudo-Partitives (Kubo 1996) in a number of languages including Dutch, German and Swedish. He also mentions the fact that some of the Det-N<sub>1</sub> combinations can be used adverbially in certain constructions:

(6) Her eyes are a shade too small and a fraction too near together (Kajita 1977: (21))

A final observation that is worth mentioning is that the quantifier-like nature of the first noun in an example like (4c), as opposed to a regular complex NP like (7), shows up when *not* is adjoined to (or otherwise a first constituent of) the NP in question.

(7) the capital of the nation

(8) 
- a. The capital of the nation was not bombed
- b. Not the capital of the nation was bombed (* on the reading corresponding to (8a))

(9) 
- a. Many students did not show up
- b. Not many students showed up

(10) a. We did not find a vestige of evidence
- b. Not a vestige of evidence was found

In Kajita's times, when X-bar theory was still optimally simple: one head per phrase, there was a serious problem in accounting for the relative dominance of the more embedded noun. How could it act as the semantic head of the complex noun phrase as a whole, or, alternatively, how could the upstairs noun, ostensibly the real head, end up semantically and, as in (10), syntactically, demoted. Kajita suggested that this might be achieved by means of a rather complex rule of reanalysis.

From a more modern perspective, this particular case is somewhat less daunting. Functional heads have appeared on the scene and the notion of (extended) projection makes it possible for a single projection to have one or more functional heads in addition to the lexical (semantic) head. In a further refinement, it has been suggested
that in addition to functional and lexical heads, an intermediate category of semi-lexical heads should be distinguished. This refinement seems necessary to account for the fact that even properties relating to semantic headship seem to oscillate between \(N_1\) and \(N_2\). I will limit myself to a brief illustration here.

Take the following examples:

(11) a. John ate a tray of pastries  
    b. John carried a tray of pastries  
    c. John turned over a tray of pastries

In (11a) it is clearly the pastries which get eaten, hence \(N_2\) must be taken to be the semantic head that satisfies the selectional requirements of the verb *eat*. In the second example, however, it is clear that *tray* is the semantic object of the verb *carry*. It is only by implication that the pastries are also carried because they happen to be on the tray. Turning now to (11c), we find that this sentence is actually ambiguous between the two readings. Either it means that the whole tray is turned over (presumably causing the pastries to fall to the floor), or it means that all the pastries on the tray are each turned over individually, resulting in a tray full of upside-down pastries, but with the tray itself still in its original position.

These semantic indications for a dual structure can be supplemented by a host of indications that syntactically as well \(N_1\) and \(N_2\) must often be assumed to be members of one and the same (extended) projection, implying that \(N_1\) must be taken to be a semi-lexical head. Limiting the discussion again to just one example, consider the fact that a case that is assigned to the whole complex noun phrase can deploy itself on \(N_1\) and \(N_2\) alike, creating a pattern looking like case agreement. This can be straightforwardly seen in German examples like the following:

(12) mit einem vollen Glas rotem Wein  
    with a full glass of red wine

On an analysis in which *rotem Wein* is an independent noun phrase embedded inside the matrix noun phrase *einem vollen Glas* this case pattern would be entirely unexpected.

For details the reader is referred to the references cited above (cf. footnote 3). For our purposes in the present article, we may conclude that the problem Kajita brought up in the 70s was a genuine problem of the kind we are interested in here, a misalignment between the syntactic head and the semantic head, but that the revisions of the theory of phrase structure that have developed during the 80s and 90s yield relatively straightforward solutions.

2.2. The *far from* construction

Whether the second and third problems that Kajita (1977) points to can be dismissed in a similarly straightforward manner is much less clear. I have dealt with the third one, the issue of Transparent Free Relatives (TFRs) elsewhere and will return to it in section 3 of the present article. The second issue is that of adjective + preposition + X
combinations that look as if the adjective is the head with the PP as its complement. One such case was briefly alluded to in the introductory section 1. And here again, the question arises whether what looks like the matrix head is not really some subordinated, adverb-like element. Take the following two examples, both taken from Kajita (1977: (2/4)):

(13)a. The airport is far from the city  
   b. Those people are far from innocent

In (13a) there is little doubt that far is the main predicate, the property predicated of airport, and, consequently, that from the city is a PP-complement to the head far. But in (13b) what seems to be expressed is that those people are innocent to a minimal degree. In other words, innocent seems to be the semantic head, while far from is a kind of adverbial modifier.

Kajita lists half a dozen more examples that have this same property: close on, close to, next to, other than, nearer to, greater than. Of these I cite two examples:

(14)a. There are next to no statistical data available  
   b. He greeted me with greater than normal politeness

In addition he also lists a number of cases that are quite similar except that the (pseudo-)head is a non-adjectival element:

(15)a. This did not cause anywhere near the difficulty experienced by the retarded children  
   b. Your mother as much as told me so

It is indeed true that such cases can generally be paraphrased with the first part substituted by some kind of adverb:

(16)a. Those people are hardly innocent (cf. (13b))  
   b. There are virtually no statistical data available (cf. (14a))  
   c. Your mother practically told me so (cf. (15b))

But it would hardly do to claim that far from, next to, as much as, etc. can be simply analyzed as adverbs. For one thing, they do seem to consist of several words and cannot easily be identified with compounds of the normal type. Furthermore, it cannot be an accident that they all have an analytical use, that is, a use in which indeed the first part is the head and the second a complement or adjunct embedded under it:

(17)a. The airport is far from the city (= (13a))  
   b. Her house is next to some general’s mansion  
   c. Have you been anywhere near the front?

The existence of these analytical uses will account for the choice of the preposition in the adverbial use if the latter is derived in some way from the analytical construction. Such a derivational approach is indeed what Kajita assumes, and he offers some interesting additional evidence.

First, he notes that when used attributively there is a contrast between the two cases. Consider the prenominal, attributive equivalents of (13a/b):
a. *the far from the city airport
b. those far from innocent people

The ungrammaticality of (18a) follows from the principle that says that prenominal adjectives must be adjacent to the noun they modify.\textsuperscript{5} But on the assumption that the structure of (18b) is identical to that of (18a), the same principle should apply to exclude this one as well. However, if we can say that far from in (18b) is somehow demoted, inserted as an adverb, invisible to the principle in question, then innocent will be the relevant head and there is no violation of the adjacency principle.

The Dutch equivalent of far from adds yet another dimension to this argument. In Dutch, prenominal adjectives are generally inflected with a schwa: -e.\textsuperscript{6} By this test, it is the second adjective, again, which acts as the head of the adjective phrase:

\begin{enumerate}
\item *een ver / verre van de stad vliegveld
\item twee ver(re)\textsuperscript{7} van onschuldig-*e mensen
\end{enumerate}

\begin{itemize}
\item a. far / far-e from the city airport
\item two far from innocent people
\end{itemize}

A last fact which we may mention here is that there are cases in which we can detect a clear ambiguity between the two readings. This can be seen in the following examples from Dutch:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Zij las alles behalve de bijbel
\item Zij reageerde alles behalve enthousiast
\item Zij was alles behalve een goede partner
\end{enumerate}

(20a) typically means that she read literally everything, but she did not read the bible. In other words, alles is the object of the verb, not bijbel. In (20b) we have the opposite situation: the adverb modifying the verb must be enthousiast since alles cannot function as an adverb (*zij reageerde alles). But (20c) is ambiguous.\textsuperscript{8} It can either mean that she was everything to me, except a good partner, or it can mean that she was a far from good partner to me, without anything being said about whether she was anything else to me instead. Hence, there are good reasons to assume two different structures for the two types of meanings.

Here, then, we have a case in which a solution along the lines suggested above in connection with partitive constructions does not seem to be viable. I have argued that there is a fundamental theoretical reason why semi-lexical heads must be of the same syntactic category as the lexical head (cf. Van Riemsdijk 1998b). But the above cases show distinct category status for the competing heads. In (14b), for example, greater has got to be an adjective, while normal politeness is evidently a noun phrase.\textsuperscript{9} Instead, I believe that the far from construction is a genuine case of what I have called a 'graft'.\textsuperscript{10} On this type of approach, the noun phrase in (21a) will have a (simplified) structure such as the one given in (21b).
In the next section I will turn to Kajita's third case, that of what Nakau (1971) called pseudo-free relatives and which, following Wilder (1998) I refer to as transparent free relatives (TFRs).

3. **Transparent free relatives**

3.1. The Japanese legacy: Nakau and Kajita

The first linguist, as far as I can determine, who recognized the relevance of Transparent Free Relatives (TFRs) is Nakau (1971). The issue was taken up again and taken further by Kajita (1977). McCawley (1988), referring to Kajita, also devotes a brief discussion to them. And much more recently, it was Wilder (1998, 1999) who took up the issue again with an article to which I have reacted in several papers.¹¹

TFRs look like Free Relatives (FRs). Take the following example which is taken from Kajita (1977: (29a)) and cited in McCawley (1988: 732).

(22) The man entered the cockpit carrying a gun, a razor, and a can of what the crew took to be gasoline

In normal FRs, the invisible head is interpreted either as a definite noun phrase or as a universally quantified one. In other words, an FR like (23a) either means (23b) or (23c).
(23)a. I am going to drink what you order  
b. I am going to drink the specific beverage that you order (definite reading)  
c. I am going to drink whatever beverage you order (universal reading)

But (22) differs from (23) in this respect because the interpretation is indefinite:

(24) The man entered the cockpit carrying a gun, a razor, and a can of something that the crew took to be gasoline

Another way to put this is to say that there is not really an invisible head here but that the predicate nominal in (23) is, in a sense, the head of the relative clause. The rest of the apparent free relative is indeed, as McCawley points out, most readily interpreted as a 'hedge'. So we again have a situation in which some element which is, apparently, deeply embedded in the syntactic structure is prominent from the point of view of the semantics and the pragmatics of the sentence, while the surrounding material in which it is embedded is pragmatically demoted to the status of a hedge.

There are, indeed, many syntactic and semantic indications that the predicative XP which is apparently inside the TFR has properties that make it look like this XP, which I call the 'callus', is part of the matrix rather than deeply embedded inside a relative clause. I will summarize them very briefly here. The first three of these have been established in Wilder (1998, 1999), the fourth, fifth and sixth have been added in Van Riemsdijk (to appear a, b).

- a TFR with a plural callus will take plural agreement in the matrix (as in (25b)) despite the fact that the *wh*-word what, which seemingly heads the relative clause, can only take singular agreement in normal FRs, cf. (25a):

  (25)a. What pleases /*please me most adorns /*adorn the living room wall  
     b. What *seems /seem to be several meteorites *was /were lying on the lawn

- a TFR with a human callus can refer to humans, as in (26b), despite the fact that the *wh*-word what, which seemingly heads the relative clause, cannot refer to humans in normal FRs, cf. (26a):

  (26)a. *She invited what was giving a talk that afternoon for lunch  
     b. She invited what I took to be a policeman (Wilder's (21))

- extraction out of the callus of a TFR is possible without the complex noun phrase constraint effect that one would expect if the callus were deeply embedded inside the FR:

  (27)a. What NP is the verb what Stowell calls adjacent to?  
     b. *What NP does the verb c-command whatever constituent is adjacent to?  
     c. *What NP does the verb c-command the PP that is adjacent to?

- the callus can be an idiom chunk that is idiomatically licensed in the matrix and not inside the FR, and furthermore, the idiom chunk can contain a pronoun bound by an element in the matrix; in normal FRs and in headed relatives this is not possible:
(28)a. Nick lost what seems to be called his marbles
   b. *Nick lost whatever round objects are called his marbles
      (non-idiomatic reading at best)
   c. *Nick lost the round objects that are called his marbles
      (non-idiomatic reading at best)

- the callus can contain a bound anaphor that is bound in the matrix and not inside
  the FR; this is neither possible in normal FRs nor in headed relatives:

(29)a. They live in what is often referred to as each other's backyard
   b. *They live in whatever location you used to refer to as each other's backyard
   c. *They live in the place that you used to refer to as each other's backyard

- when the callus is a noun phrase, its case must satisfy not only the requirements
  inside the TFR but also those of the matrix environment:\textsuperscript{14}

(30)a. Ich habe mir was man als einen\textsubscript{acc} schnellen\textsubscript{acc} Wagen bezeichnen könnte gekauft.
       'I have bought what one could characterize as a fast car'
   b. Ich habe mir was von vielen als
      \{
        *einnom schneller\textsubscript{nom} Wagen
        *einen\textsubscript{acc} schnellen\textsubscript{acc} Wagen
      \}
      bezeichnet werden
       'I have bought what by many be characterized be'
   c. Was viele als
      \{
        *einnom schneller\textsubscript{nom} Wagen
        *einen\textsubscript{acc} schnellen\textsubscript{acc} Wagen
      \}
      bezeichnen würden wird selten gekauft.
       'What many as a fast car characterized would is rarely bought'
   d. Was als ein\textsubscript{nom} schnellen\textsubscript{nom} Wagen bezeichnet werden könnte
      wird selten gekauft.
       'What as a fast car characterized be could is rarely bought'

There is actually a seventh consideration, discussed in Kajita (1977), which should be
brought up here since both Wilder and I had failed to do so in our recent publications
on TFRs. This is an argument derived from the fact that only identical categories can
be conjoined in coordinated structures. Consider the following example.

(31)a. He served wine and what the Italians call prosciutto
   b. *He served wine and what the Italians call al dente
   c. He served the wine and what was simmering on the stove

In these examples, \textit{wine} is apparently conjoined with a (T)FR. In (31a) \textit{prosciutto} is a
noun. Hence, we would expect the conjunction to be grammatical, regardless of
whether it is the (T)FR or the callus (\textit{prosciutto}) that is conjoined with \textit{wine}. But in
(31b) the callus is \textit{al dente}, which in Italian is a PP but when used in English is
presumably an adjective or an adverb. And indeed on the typical TFR reading
('something which the Italians call \textit{al dente}') this sentence is out. If we forcibly
construe it as a true FR ('the thing that the Italians call \textit{al dente}'), the sentence could
be marginally grammatical. In this case (31b) would be on a par with a regular FR
case like in (31c), which is perfectly grammatical.
These seven considerations demonstrate, convincingly in my mind, that the callus is, in Kajita's and McCawley's words, the head of the TFR. The question then arises how TFRs can be analysed to reflect this insight. Kajita and McCawley suggest that this should be done in terms of a rule of 'reanalysis'. But how this reanalysis is supposed to work remains entirely vague, except for the fact that a transformational apparatus of considerable power would be required to raise the callus into head position and to adjoin the remnant relative clause to its left.\footnote{15}

Leaving a transformational derivation aside, Wilder (1998, to appear) suggests that there are two viable alternatives, viz. a three-dimensional constituent sharing analysis and a backward deletion or ellipsis approach. Wilder adopts the latter approach, while Van Riemsdijk (1998a) pursues the former option, which traces its antecedents to Lakoff (1974) and can be formalized along the lines proposed in Moltmann (1992). A formalization of three-dimensional structures using minimalist terminology can be found in Citko (1998).

Under the deletion approach and under the grafts theory, the structure of an example like (32a) would be roughly as shown in (32b) and (32c) respectively.

(32)
\begin{enumerate}
  \item He carried what the crew took to be gasoline
  \item He carried [what, the crew took [e, to be gasoline] gasoline
  \item
\end{enumerate}

In the next and final subsection, I will present an argument against Wilder's proposal.
3.2. Problems with a deletion account

An immediate problem with a simplistic deletion account is that a FR like the bracketed one in (32b) does not really have a source. In such an analysis, the FR is something like an adjunct to a head noun, gasoline. Of course, nouns do take relative clauses, but, at least in English, we do not expect such relative clauses to the left. Rather, relative clauses are normally positioned somewhere to the right of the head noun. Of course, this particular relative clause is a reduced one in that its predicate nominal is deleted, but it is not reduced in the relevant sense. Participles and the like, which are conceivably derived from relative clauses, would occur on the left hand side, but, unlike these, the TFR is finite and still carries its wh-word.

That is not all. The callus can also be an AP or a PP, as in (33).

(33)a. The auk is what biologists term pterorhine
    b. They remain what is called of two minds about this issue

Needless to say, APs and PPs do not take relative clauses. The matter is further complicated by the fact that the callus can also be embedded inside other XPs. For example, the callus can be an attributive adjective or an adverb modifying some other constituent like an adjective. Consider (34).

(34)a. Bill owns three what some people would consider to be extravagant cars
    b. In this example, the variable is what most linguists would characterize as improperly bound

In (34a) we know that the TFR does not have the full noun phrase in its scope since it follows the numeral. And in (34b) the reading in which the TFR has scope only over the adverb is the most natural one given the fact that we are talking about a variable, hence there is no discussion about it being bound. So what the hedge is about is the fact that binding is improper. Again, attributive adjectives and preadjectival adverbial modifiers cannot host relative clauses of any kind. Yet, a deletion analysis would seem to force the assumption on us that they can.

Wilder's proposal, of course, is more sophisticated than this. He assumes that the FR originates as an 'independent phrase marker'. Subsequently, this independent phrase marker, presumably a CP, is inserted in its surface position, a process which Wilder takes to be part of the phonological side of the grammar. Then deletion applies. This is the way Wilder illustrates his proposal:

(35)a. Syntax: independent phrase markers
      [he bought [DP a guitar]] [what he took to be [DP a guitar]]
    b. Phonology: parenthetical placement and deletion
      John bought <what he took to be a guitar> a guitar

This may be a way to avoid the problems mentioned above, and it is attractive in a number of ways. First, it is true that parentheticals are often used to express hedges in a way very similar to TFRs. The following are some examples.

(36)a. He carried, if I am not entirely mistaken, a can of gasoline
    b. This is not, as far as I remember, an Italian wine
In fact, one might say that TFRs and constructions of the *far from*-type are special cases of parenthetical constructions: basically they are the same except for the fact that for one constituent (the callus) they are parasitic on the host structure. The problem of specifying what is a well-formed parenthetical is not an easy one. And similarly, the question of when and where a constituent may be shared between a parenthetical and the host structure is far from trivial. In the case of *far from* there is probably no escaping the fact that lexical factors play a role, since these constructions are highly sensitive to grammaticalization. In the case of TFRs, however, this is much less obvious. Observationally, the callus has to be a predicative XP in the TFR. But other than some tentative suggestions in Van Riemsdijk (to appear b) I have nothing further to say about this question, pending further investigation. This problem, needless to say, remains neutral between the deletion and the grafting approaches.

Second, certain relative clauses, in particular ad-clausal ones, are often inserted inside a sentence in the manner of parentheticals. Consider (37).

(37) He was carrying a razor, which is bad enough, and a can of gasoline, which is deadly.

Third, the very TFRs that we are looking at can, when complete, be used as righthand sentential conjuncts:

(38) He was carrying a can of gasoline, or (at least) what I thought was a can of gasoline.

There is no denying, then, that there is considerable similarity between parentheticals and grafts. On the three-dimensional theory which I am advocating, parentheticals are treated pretty much like grafts, as pointed out above, except that there is no (visible) callus. So this is not a point of contention.

I nevertheless have two problems with Wilder's proposal. First, the position of an unreduced parenthetical relative clause is different from that of a reduced one:

(39) a. He took his daughter to the movies, or what I thought was his daughter
    b. He took his daughter, or what I thought was his daughter, to the movies
    c. *He took, or what I thought was his daughter, his daughter to the movies

(40) a. He has three obscene pictures on his office walls, or at least what I would consider obscene *(pictures)
    b. He has three obscene, or at least what I would consider obscene, pictures on his office walls
    c. *He has three, or at least what I would consider obscene, obscene pictures on his office walls

Though the theory of grafting has not been developed in any detail yet, it is still rather easy to see that this difficulty will not arise. That is so because it is the shared constituent which determines where the material of the TFR goes. If, as is true in most of the English examples, the shared constituent is at the end of the TFR, then the TFR must be linearized in front of that element.\(^{16}\)

The second point, related to this property, is this. As I have argued in Van Riemsdijk (1998a), contra Wilder, the callus can be in the middle of the TFR. This is illustrated
in many of the Dutch and German examples discussed above. Consider (30a), repeated here as (41)

(41) Ich habe mir [was man als einen schnellen Wagen bezeichnen könnte] gekauft.
I have me what one as a fast car characterize could bought
'I have bought what one could characterize as a fast car'

Here the callus (einen schnellen Wagen) is in the predicate nominal position within the relative clause, but because German is verb final it is followed by the verb cluster. In terms of an approach in terms of parentheticals, this would mean that parentheticals can sometimes be discontinuous. As far as I am aware, however, discontinuous parentheticals do not exist. Certainly crude attempts at constructing them like the following are hopelessly bad:

(42)a. *He was carrying, if I am not, a can of gasoline, entirely mistaken
b. *There was, to the best, no solution, of my knowledge, to this problem

(43)a. #These are, I believe, headed for, you might say, the shredder
b. * if = These are, I believe you might say, headed for the shredder

(43a) is ungrammatical on the reading where the two chunks of parenthetical are interpreted as constituting a single parenthetical as in (43b), though it is grammatical if the sentence happens to have two independent parentheticals in it.

While much remains to be done in working out the details of a theory of grafting, I believe that the positional properties of TFRs that I have just listed argue in favor of it and against an approach along the lines suggested by Wilder.

4. Concluding remarks

There can be no doubt that the syntactic and pragmatic properties of a sentence are often misaligned. In particular, what is pragmatically the main or dominant element in the message may very often show up as an embedded or even adjoined element in the syntax. There is nothing wrong with this in a theory which has autonomous components for syntax, semantics and pragmatics. What the above examples have shown, however, is that there are cases in which, so to speak, pragmatics has intruded into syntax, resulting in structures that are no longer representable as canonical trees but which are, in a sense, closer to the semantics or pragmatics of what is being conveyed. The idea that I have argued for is that such pragmatic intruders often come in the guise of grafts.

In his 1993 article for the Nicolas Ruwet Festschrift, Ferenc Kiefer asks 'où s'arrête la syntaxe?', a highly relevant question, as we have just seen. His conclusion in that article was that the idea of an autonomous and formal syntactic component should be weakened to a certain extent. He suggests that cognitive principles that have their roots in the way in which our everyday way of thinking is organized may frequently intrude into the more formal domains of linguistic description. From this perspective, we syntacticians are led to ask 'où s'arrête la pragmatique?'. What I have tried to do in the present contribution is to suggest that at least certain intrusions into syntax should
actually be accommodated within formal syntax proper by means of a theory of grafts which, while sketchy and programmatic for the time being, holds considerable promise when it comes to accommodating precisely this type of interaction between pragmatics and syntax.
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Riemsdijk, Hendrik C. van
Vos, Riet

Wilder, Chris

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Williams, Edwin W.
Notes

1. I would like to thank the students in my class at the Thermi/Mytilene (Lesbos) International GLOW Summer School in the summer of 1999 for lively discussion, in particular Elena Anagnostopoulou, Barbara Citko, Angeliki Ralli and Edwin Williams. Thanks are also due to Alex Grosu for stimulating e-mail exchanges and to Masayuki Oishi for sending me some of the harder to find Japanese papers.


4. I am ignoring here the gastronomical trick of preparing food receptacles that can themselves be eaten such as trays made from deep fried potato dough or what have you.


6. Roughly speaking this is always true except when the noun phrase is in the indefinite neuter singular, in which case inflection is zero.

7. The preferred form in this adverbial use is verre. This is not to be confused with the inflected form of the adjective. It is a somewhat archaic frozen form, which is incidentally another indication that these constructions have been subject to a substantial degree of grammaticalization. This grammaticalization effect is also evidenced when the ‘adverb’ is used in isolation, elliptically. Here verre van can be used without any object of the preposition, where in English a pronoun is required:
   (i) Hij is niet onschuldig -- verre van
   (ii) He is not innocent  -- far from 

8. A referee points out, correctly, that according to prevalent Dutch spelling conventions alles behalve can also be spelled as a single word: allesbehalve. Thereby, an example like (20c) is disambiguated through orthographic means. This may quite plausibly be interpreted as a signal for some form of reanalysis such as the ‘graft’ proposal to be detailed below.

9. The categorial status of the complement may not be fully transparent in all cases. Take the examples of the type (19b). If we say that innocent is an AP here, we are allowing the preposition from to take AP-complements. Indeed, from also occurs in expressions like the sea turned from blue to gray, but color terms tend to waver between adjectival and nominal use. On the one hand, color terms are easily usable in nominal positions (blue is a nicer color), but on the other hand, comparatives are not excluded, as in the light changed from darkish to brighter than my eyes could tolerate. Pursuing this matter is beyond the scope of this article, and the main thrust of the present text is unaffected by this issue.

10. Lakoff (1974) had a similar idea and called such structures ‘syntactic amalgams’. I prefer the botanical metaphor since it typically applies to trees: the idea is that a subtree (the graft or the scion) is grafted onto a matrix tree (the stock). The junction of the two substructures, again following botanical terminology, I refer to as the ‘callus’. To the extent that the notion of grafting involves subtrees that are joined together, it might be thought to be identical to the minimalist notion of ‘merge’. The difference is, however, that ‘merge’ inserts the root of one subtree into a preterminal element of another subtree, whereas the grafting process joins two subtrees at the (pre-)terminal level. (In the latter respect, of course, the metaphor is not entirely appropriate.) See Citko (1998) for an extension of the notion ‘merge’ to three-dimensional structures.


12. See note 10 for some comments on the choice of terminology. Under the theory I advocate, the XP is shared between the matrix and the relative clause. Given the botanical metaphor I have
There is an additional argument, related to the one from extraction, which has to do with apparent extraction from noun phrases in Dutch, cf. Van Riemsdijk (1998a). In an example like (i), it appears as if the *wh*-word has been extracted out of a PP which is embedded within a noun phrase.

(i)  *Waar, heeft Jan [de conceptversie van e] afgewezen?*

The *wh*-word has the draft version of rejected

*What did Jan reject the draft version of?*

But it can be shown that this type of extraction is only possible if the PP is somehow detached from its nominal host. For example, matrix adverbs can separate the PP from the NP, as in (ii). See Van Riemsdijk (1997) for details.

(ii)  *Waar, heeft Jan [de conceptversie] gisteren (‘yesterday’) [van e] afgewezen?*

In the absence of an adverb, the detachment in question is string vacuous. Consider now what happens if the noun phrase from which detachment takes place is part of a TFR. (iii) shows that detachment within the TFR, while perhaps possible, does not enable *wh*-extraction from that position. But if the detachment process is taken to be part of the matrix we expect the linearization of the scion to place the material to the right of the callus **between the callus and the detached PP**. This is exactly what happens, as (iv) demonstrates.

(iii)  *Waar, heeft Jan [wat je als [de conceptversie] [van e] kunt beschouwen] afgewezen*

(iv)  *?Waar, heeft Jan [wat je als [de conceptversie] kunt beschouwen] [van e] afgewezen*

This is modulo case syncretism. If the masculine noun *Wagen* in the text example is replaced by the neuter noun *Auto*, the nominative and accusative forms are identical, and thereby all four variants become grammatical. See Van Riemsdijk (to appear b) for more discussion.

A reviewer suggests that case matching has been shown to be a frequent property of regular FRs, as shown in considerable detail in Groos and Van Riemsdijk (1981) for German and a number of other languages. This, according to the reviewer, suggests that TFRs may be regular FRs after all. Note, however, that case matching in FRs concerns the case on the *wh*-word, whereas the case matching observed in TFRs concerns the predicate nominal. One could object to that, however, that in TFRs the *wh*-word and the predicate nominal must agree in case anyway since they stand in a secondary predication relation to each other. This is where case syncretism comes in, though. It was shown in Groos and Van Riemsdijk (1981) that in regular FRs the formal case features need not match precisely in those cases where the surface form is nevertheless identical. The only relevant case in German being the neuter singular *was*, which is both nominative and accusative. In the case of TFRs, however, it is the predicate nominal itself which is sensitive to case syncretism, as shown in detail in Van Riemsdijk (to appear b). The relevance of this distinction is immediately visible in the text example (30b). Here the *wh*-word is *was*, which can pass both for a nominative and for an accusative. The corresponding predicate nominals are morphologically distinct, however, and hence a case conflict ensues, regardless of which form is chosen. Case matching effects on the predicate nominal therefore stand out as a unique property of TFRs.

I would not be surprised to see an attempt at just such an analysis in a general head raising framework of the type suggested by Kayne (1994). See also Bianchi (1999).

Wilder (1998, to appear) argues, in fact, that this is a necessary condition and adduces this fact in support of his backward deletion theory in view of the fact that the right node raising (RNR) construction, if analysed in terms of deletion, is subject to the same condition. I have argued in Van Riemsdijk (1998a)

(a) that the argument is circular, since RNR is also a prime candidate for an analysis in terms of grafts,
(b) that the argument is empirically incorrect since even in English the shared constituent can be
   internal, as in *there was [what appeared to be a totem pole to most of the bystanders] standing in our front yard*,
(c) that an internal shared constituent is even the normal case in German and Dutch, see the second
   point in the text, and
(d) that in addition to right peripheral and internal shared constituents left peripheral shared
   constituents exist as well, one example being regular free relatives of the matching type, cf. also